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I. INTRODUCTION
A symposium on federal appellate procedure may seem an unlikely
venue for hot-button, ripped-from-the-headlines subjects. On the Venn
diagram of our current moment, however, important questions of
appellate jurisdiction have intersected with the myriad ethical questions
surrounding the presidency of Donald J. Trump. 1 This Article examines
the jurisdictional issues that have arisen in cases challenging Trump’s
conduct under the U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses—issues that
are currently headed for the U.S. Supreme Court. 2
Part II of this Article summarizes two lawsuits—one in Maryland
federal court and one in D.C. federal court—alleging that Trump’s
continued receipt of income from his various business enterprises violates
the Emoluments Clauses. Part III describes early rulings by district court
judges rejecting Trump’s arguments that these cases should be dismissed
at the pleading stage. Part IV turns to Trump’s efforts to obtain immediate
appellate review of those rulings, highlighting the different paths to
appellate review that each case followed: one to the Fourth Circuit and the
other to the D.C. Circuit. Part V critically examines both of these paths,
arguing that they reflect a mistaken view of the relationship between
appellate mandamus and the certification process set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

1. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, Federal Appeals Court Rules for Trump in Emoluments Case,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/us/politics/trump-hotelemoluments-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/N6MB-BZ7E] (“In a legal victory for President
Trump, a federal appeals court panel on Wednesday ordered the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming that
he had violated the Constitution by collecting profits from government guests at his hotel in the
nation’s capital. . . . The lawsuit, which alleges violations of the Constitution’s anti-corruption, or
‘emoluments,’ clauses, was about to enter the evidence-gathering phase.”); Ann E. Marimow &
Jonathan O’Connell, Trump Business Dealings Argued at Federal Appeals Court in Emoluments
Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/trumpbusiness-dealings-argued-at-federal-appeals-court-in-emoluments-case/2019/12/09/84ee5286-179211ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_story.html [https://perma.cc/39E5-EFGM] (“Even as the judges seemed
troubled that Congress may have no other viable way to enforce the Constitution’s anti-corruption
emoluments provision, they did not seem prepared to allow the lawsuit from more than 200
Democratic lawmakers to move forward.”); Bobby Allyn, Trump Still Faces 3 Lawsuits Over His
Business Empire, NPR (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/12/787167408/trump-stillfaces-3-lawsuits-over-his-business-empire
[https://perma.cc/9SSZ-QE8K]
(describing
the
emoluments litigation as seeking “a court order declaring that Trump is in violation of the
Constitution’s Emoluments Clause, an anti-corruption provision that prohibits federal officials from
receiving gifts or money from state and foreign governments”).
2. See infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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II. SUING TRUMP TO ENFORCE THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE(S)
The Constitution contains two clauses relating to emoluments. One
addresses foreign emoluments, and another addresses domestic
emoluments. The Foreign Emoluments Clause appears in the eighth
clause of Article I, section 9. It provides that “no Person holding any
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” 3 The Domestic
Emoluments Clause appears in the seventh clause of Article II, section 1.
It provides: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during
the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive
within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of
them.” 4
In the early years of the Trump administration, several lawsuits were
filed in federal district courts alleging violations of the Emoluments
Clauses. This article focuses on two of these lawsuits. One case, captioned
District of Columbia v. Trump, was filed in U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland. The plaintiffs in this case are the State of Maryland
and the District of Columbia. Another case, captioned Blumenthal v.
Trump, was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by
201 members of the House and Senate. 5
There are some differences in the particular activities alleged in each
case, but the basic theory is that Trump, through his financial interests in
various businesses, has received payments and other benefits from foreign
governments and state governments. Judge Sullivan’s opinion in
Blumenthal v. Trump summarized the plaintiffs’ allegations this way:
Trump “has a financial interest in vast business holdings around the world
that engage in dealings with foreign governments and receive benefits
from those governments.” 6 Trump “owns ‘more than 500 separate
entities—hotels, golf courses, media properties, books, management
companies, residential and commercial buildings airplanes and a

3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. These are not the only emoluments lawsuits against Trump. Another one was filed in a
Manhattan federal court. See CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated
and remanded, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019), amended, 953 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2020). That case,
however, has not raised the same issues regarding appellate jurisdiction, as explained infra note 35.
6. Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2018) [hereinafter Blumenthal I]
(quoting plaintiffs’ amended complaint).
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profusion of shell companies set up to capitalize on licensing deals.’” 7
These businesses “receive funds and make a profit from payments by
foreign governments” and “they will continue to do so while he is
President.” 8 Through these financial interests, Trump “has accepted, and
will accept in the future, emoluments from foreign states.” 9
Judge Messitte’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Trump focuses
on activities at Trump’s hotel in Washington, D.C. According to the
plaintiffs’ allegations, “a number of foreign governments have patronized
or expressed a definite intention to patronize the Hotel, some of which
have indicated that they are doing so precisely because of the President’s
association with it.” 10 These include Saudi Arabia, which “spent
thousands of dollars at the Hotel between October 1, 2016, and March 31,
2017.” 11 In addition, “at least some foreign governments have withdrawn
their business from other hotels in the area not affiliated with the President
and have transferred it to the Hotel,” including Kuwait, which “held its
National Day celebration at the Hotel . . . despite having made a prior
‘save the date reservation with the Four Seasons hotel.’” 12
Similar allegations addressed the Domestic Emoluments Clause. For
example, “at least one State—the State of Maine—patronized the Hotel
when its Governor, Paul LePage, visited Washington to discuss official
business with the Federal Government, including discussions with the
President.” 13 This included a trip where “the President and Governor
LePage appeared together at a news conference at which the President
signed an executive order to review orders of the prior administration that
established national monuments within the National Park Service”—an
order that “could apply to a park and national monument in Maine, which
President Obama had established over LePage’s objections in 2016.” 14
In both of these cases, Trump asked the courts to dismiss the claims
at the earliest possible stage, making a range of arguments. In both cases,
however, the district courts rejected Trump’s efforts. The next Part
summarizes these early district court rulings.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734 (D. Md. 2018) (quoting plaintiffs’
amendment complaint).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citations omitted).
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III. EARLY DISTRICT COURT RULINGS IN THE EMOLUMENTS LITIGATION
A.

District of Columbia v. Trump

In the action filed by the District of Columbia and the State of
Maryland in the Maryland district court, Trump made several arguments
for dismissing the case. First, he argued that the plaintiffs lacked both
Article III standing and prudential standing. In terms of Article III
standing, the district court agreed with Trump that Maryland had
“suffered no injury to its sovereign interests.” 15 However, it found that:
“Plaintiffs have alleged injuries-in-fact to their quasi-sovereign,
proprietary, and parens patriae interests that are concrete and
particularized, actual and imminent. Those injuries are fairly traceable to
the President’s purported conduct and are likely to be redressed by the
Court through appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief if Plaintiffs
succeed on the merits.” 16 As to these particular plaintiffs, however, Article
III was only satisfied with respect to Trump’s hotel in Washington, D.C. 17
The district court reached a similar conclusion on prudential
standing. It first found that the District of Columbia and the State of
Maryland fell within the “zone of interests” of the Emoluments Clauses,
finding that “the Emoluments Clauses clearly were and are meant to
protect all Americans” and “[t]hat being so, there is no reason why
Plaintiffs, a subset of Americans who have demonstrated present injury or
the immediate likelihood of injury by reason of the President’s purported
violations of the Emoluments Clauses, should be prevented from
challenging what might be the President’s serious disregard of the
Constitution.” 18 The court then rejected Trump’s argument that the suit
was barred by the political question doctrine. On this issue, the district
15. Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 752–53.
17. Id. at 753 (“[T]he Court finds that these particular Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the
operations of the Trump Organization or the benefits the President may receive from its operations
outside the District of Columbia. But to be perfectly clear: The Court reaches this conclusion only
with respect to these Plaintiffs and the particular facts of the present case. This is in no way meant to
say that other States or other businesses or individuals immediately affected by the same sort of
violations alleged in the case at bar, e.g., a major hotel competitor in Palm Beach (near Mar-a-Lago)
or indeed a hotel competitor anywhere in the State of Florida, might not have standing to pursue
litigation similar to that which is in process here.”).
18. Id. at 755. The district court recognized, but did not resolve, the plaintiffs’ argument that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118 (2014), had abandoned the zone of interest test. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F.
Supp. 3d 725, 755 (D. Md. 2018) (“The Court need not engage the issue of whether the zone of
interests test has been abandoned. Assuming it has not been, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fall within
the zone of interests of the Emoluments Clauses.”).
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court concluded that there was no “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment” of a President’s compliance with the Emoluments Clauses
“to a coordinate political department,” 19 nor was there a “‘lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving’ this
issue.” 20
Turning to other arguments seeking to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim, the district court rejected Trump’s view that the
Emoluments Clauses covered only “payment made in connection with a
particular employment over and above one’s salary” and therefore did not
apply to “payments to a federal official for any independent services
rendered, such as for the rental of hotel rooms or event spaces privately
owned by the officeholder, or payments for meals at his restaurants.” 21
Instead, the district court found that the Emoluments Clauses cover “any
profit, gain, or advantage, of more than de minimis value, received by him,
directly or indirectly, from foreign, the federal, or domestic
governments,” including “profits from private transactions, even those
involving services given at fair market value.” 22 The district court also
rejected the argument put forward by amici curiae that the President
himself is not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause at all. 23 The
district court did not, however, rule on Trump’s argument that he had
absolute immunity from suit for claims brought against him in his
individual capacity. 24
B.

Blumenthal v. Trump

In the action filed by members of Congress in D.C. District Court,
Trump sought dismissal on a number of grounds. The first was that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of a lack of standing. The
district court found that the plaintiffs did have Article III standing,
recognizing that Trump was depriving them of the opportunity to give or
withhold their consent to his acceptance of foreign emoluments, in
19. Id. at 756 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2012)).
20. Id. at 757 (quoting Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195).
21. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 880 (D. Md. 2018).
22. Id. at 904.
23. Id. at 882–86 (“The Court concludes that the President holds an ‘Office of Profit or Trust
under [the United States]’ and, accordingly, is subject to the restrictions contained in the Foreign
Emoluments Clause.” (brackets in original)).
24. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 930 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2019), appeal dismissed,
959 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). That argument, of course, would not have stopped the
litigation entirely, because the claims against Trump in his official capacity for injunctive and
declaratory relief would have survived. Indeed, as explained infra notes 46–47 and accompanying
text, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Trump in his individual capacity.
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violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 25 This was a constitutionally
cognizable injury in fact, which was fairly traceable to Trump’s failure to
seek consent from Congress. That injury could be redressed by the court’s
grant of the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs,
which would include an order “enjoining the President from accepting
‘any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever’ from a
foreign state without obtaining ‘the Consent of Congress.’” 26
In addition to asserting a lack of standing, Trump sought to dismiss
this suit for failure to state a claim, arguing that profits Trump received
through his business interests did not qualify as emoluments subject to the
Emoluments Clause. 27 The district court rejected this argument, defining
the term Emolument “broadly” to include “any profit, gain, or
advantage.” 28 The district court also rejected Trump’s argument that there
was no implied cause of action to seek injunctive relief under the
Emoluments Clause. It found that the plaintiffs’ allegations—if proven—
revealed that “the President is accepting prohibited foreign emoluments
without seeking congressional consent, thereby defeating the purpose of
the Clause to guard against even the possibility of ‘corruption and foreign
influence.’” 29 The court therefore had “equitable discretion to enjoin
allegedly unconstitutional action by the President.” 30 Likewise, the
district court rejected Trump’s argument that an injunction against him
would unconstitutionally “impose a condition on his ability to serve as
President and to perform the duties he is duly elected to perform.” 31 The
district court reasoned that “seeking congressional consent prior to
accepting prohibited foreign emoluments is a ministerial duty,” and that a
President “has no discretion as to whether or not to comply with it in the
first instance.” 32

25. Blumenthal I, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 52–72 (D.D.C. 2018).
26. Id. at 72 (quoting Complaint ¶¶ 84–92).
27. Blumenthal v. Trump, 373 F. Supp. 3d 191, 194 (D.D.C. 2019).
28. Id. at 207 (“‘Emolument’ is broadly defined as any profit, gain, or advantage.” (citing
District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 905 (D. Md. 2018))).
29. Id. at 209 (quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966)).
30. Id. (citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015), for the
proposition that “we have long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive
relief against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal law”).
31. Id. at 211 (quoting Motion to Dismiss).
32. Id. at 212.
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IV. MULTIPLE PATHS TO APPELLATE REVIEW
The general rule is that the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction
to review “final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 33
None of the district court rulings described above constituted such “final
decisions” in the traditional sense, because they simply rejected President
Trump’s efforts to obtain an early dismissal of the action. They surely did
not “end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment.” 34 Rather, the rulings meant that those cases
would proceed in the district courts, in order to adjudicate the merits of
the plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, Trump’s attempts to contest the
district court’s rulings on appeal raised interesting questions of appellate
jurisdiction. 35
Trump’s first move was to ask the district courts in both District of
Columbia v. Trump and Blumenthal v. Trump to certify their rulings for
an immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section
1292(b) provides a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, by
which the district court may state in writing that a non-final order
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion” and that “an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 36
Such a certification then gives the court of appeals “discretion” to “permit
an appeal to be taken from such order.” 37 In both Blumenthal and District
of Columbia, however, the district courts initially refused to certify their
rulings for immediate appeals under § 1292(b). 38 But Trump did not take
no for an answer. The following Sections describe Trump’s attempts to
obtain appellate review in the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit.

33. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (emphasis added).
34. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
35. Appellate jurisdiction has not been a concern in the case that was filed in Manhattan federal
court. See supra note 5. There, the district court agreed with Trump’s arguments and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims, see CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), leading to a final
judgment in Trump’s favor that the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit. See CREW v. Trump,
939 F.3d 131, 160 (2nd Cir. 2019) (vacating and remanding the district court’s dismissal).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
37. Id.
38. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 832 (D. Md. 2018) (denying
§ 1292(b) certification); Blumenthal v. Trump, 382 F. Supp. 3d 77, 79 (D.D.C. 2019) (denying
§ 1292(b) certification).
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The Fourth Circuit

Following the Maryland district court’s rulings, Trump pursued two
separate cases in the Fourth Circuit: First, he filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus. 39 Second, he filed a notice of appeal, although that particular
appeal challenged solely the district court’s refusal to rule on his argument
that he was absolutely immune from suit in his individual capacity. 40
In a case captioned In re Trump, a three-judge panel issued a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to certify its rulings for interlocutory
appeal under § 1292(b). Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney
v. United States District Court, the opinion by Judge Niemeyer found that
“there is no other mechanism for prompt appellate review of the threshold
legal issues raised by the District and Maryland’s complaint, which asserts
unprecedented claims directly against a sitting President,” 41 and that the
district court’s refusal to certify its ruling under § 1292(b) “amounted to
a clear abuse of discretion.” 42 However, “rather than remand the case to
the district court simply to have it pointlessly go through the motions of
certifying,” the Fourth Circuit panel explained that it would “take the
district court’s orders as certified and grant our permission to the President
to appeal those orders, thus taking jurisdiction under § 1292(b).” 43 The
panel then addressed the merits of the Article III standing issue,
concluding that neither the District of Columbia nor the state of Maryland
had Article III standing to pursue their claims against Trump for violating
the Emoluments Clauses. 44
In a second opinion issued that same day, captioned District of
Columbia v. Trump, the same panel considered Trump’s appeal regarding
the individual-capacity claims. 45 Shortly after Trump filed his notice of
appeal on this issue, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntarily dismissal
(without prejudice) of their individual-capacity claims in the district
court. 46 They accordingly sought dismissal of this appeal for lack of

39. See In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 360 (4th Cir. 2019).
40. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 930 F.3d 209, 209 (4th Cir. 2019).
41. In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 371 (quoting Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S.
367, 382 (2004)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 372.
44. See id. at 375–79.
45. Trump, 930 F.3d at 211 (“[H]ere, we address the President’s motion filed in his individual
capacity, which raises the additional issue of whether the President has absolute immunity and which
is presented to us by appeal.” (emphasis in original)).
46. See id. at 212 (“[O]n December 19, the District and Maryland filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal ‘without prejudice’ of their individual-capacity claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i).”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 6

668

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:659

appellate jurisdiction. 47 Judge Niemeyer’s opinion for the panel rejected
the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional argument, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ “lost
the ability to act on the [individual-capacity] claims in the district court”
after Trump had filed his notice of appeal. 48 Then, using an interpretation
of the collateral order doctrine that allows denials of governmental
immunity to be immediately reviewed, Judge Niemeyer ruled that the
district court had effectively denied Trump’s invocation of absolute
immunity by ordering the parties to begin discovery. 49 Finally, invoking
its ruling on the mandamus petition, the panel concluded that the District
of Columbia and Maryland lacked Article III standing to pursue their
individual-capacity claims against Trump. 50
On October 15, 2019, the full Fourth Circuit granted the plaintiffs’
petitions for en banc rehearing in both cases. 51 And on May 14, 2020, the
en banc Fourth Circuit voted 9-to-6 to overturn the panel decisions in both
In re Trump and District of Columbia v. Trump—thereby reinstating the
district court’s decisions and allowing the litigation to proceed. 52 In both
cases, Judge Motz authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Judge
Gregory and Judges King, Keenan, Wynn, Diaz, Floyd, Thacker, and
Harris. 53 Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Agee, Richardson, Quattlebaum,
and Rushing dissented, stating that they would have reversed the district
court and ordered the litigation be dismissed. 54
47. See id.
48. Id. at 214.
49. Id. at 213 (“After it deferred ruling on the President’s invocation of immunity, it ordered
the parties to begin with discovery, thereby effectively denying the President the important aspect of
immunity that he be spared the burdens of pretrial proceedings, including discovery.”).
50. Id. at 215 (“Because the claims that the District and Maryland assert against the President
in his individual capacity are identical to the claims they assert against him in his official capacity
and are premised on the same factual allegations, our decision in appeal No. 18-2486, also decided
today and addressing the same standing issue, governs the outcome here. . . . [T]he District and
Maryland do not have standing under Article III to pursue their claims against the President in any
capacity, including his individual capacity.”).
51. See In re Trump, 780 F. App’x 36, 37 (4th Cir. 2019); District of Columbia v. Trump, 780
F. App’x 38, 38 (4th Cir. 2019).
52. See In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc); District of Columbia v. Trump,
959 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
53. See Trump, 958 F.3d at 278; District of Columbia, 959 F.3d at 128. In the mandamus action,
Judge Wynn also wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by Judges Keenan, Floyd, and Thacker.
See Trump, 958 F.3d at 289 (Wynn, J., concurring).
54. In the mandamus action, Judge Wilkinson authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Judges Niemeyer, Agee, Richardson, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, see Trump, 958 F.3d at 290
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting), and Judge Niemeyer authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Judges Wilkinson, Agee, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, see id. at 309 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). In
District of Columbia v. Trump, Judge Niemeyer authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Judges Wilkinson, Agee, Quattlebaum, and Rushing, see 959 F.3d at 132 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting),
and Judge Richardson authored a dissenting opinion, see id. at 142 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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Judge Motz’s majority opinion in In re Trump denied Trump’s
petition for a writ of mandamus. Noting that “[t]he procedural posture in
which this case comes to us—a petition for a writ of mandamus—is not
window dressing,” she concluded that “[a] petitioner must establish a
clear and indisputable right to the relief sought for a writ of mandamus to
issue, and the President has not done so.” 55 Judge Motz first rejected
Trump’s argument for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court
to certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b). 56 She did not
completely “foreclose the possibility that in an appropriate case a writ of
mandamus may issue to order a district court to certify an interlocutory
appeal under § 1292(b).” 57 For example, “[i]f the district court ignored a
request for certification, denied such a request based on nothing more than
caprice, or made its decision in manifest bad faith, issuing the writ might
well be appropriate.” 58 In the emoluments case, however, the district
court’s § 1292(b) ruling “was not arbitrary or based on passion or
prejudice; to the contrary, it ‘was in its nature a judicial act.’” 59 Mandamus
was not appropriate vis-à-vis the district court’s refusal to certify the case
under § 1292(b) because “the district court promptly recognized and ruled
on the request for certification in a detailed written opinion that applied
the correct legal standards.” 60
Next, Judge Motz rejected Trump’s argument that—regardless of
§ 1292(b) certification—the Fourth Circuit should issue a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the lawsuit. She noted
that such relief would require Trump to “establish that it is not merely
likely, but ‘clear and indisputable,’ that the entire action cannot lie.” 61
Although the plaintiffs’ legal claims were “novel,” Judge Motz found that
“reasonable jurists can disagree in good faith on the merits of these
claims”—as well as on whether the plaintiffs suffered a “cognizable
injury.” 62 Judge Motz also rejected Trump’s argument that a writ of
mandamus was justified because of separation of powers, either because
the suit would “subject[] the Executive Branch to intrusive discovery,” 63

55. Trump, 958 F.3d at 289.
56. See id. at 282–85.
57. Id. at 285.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 15 (1856)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis in original)
62. Id. at 286.
63. Id. at 287 (discussing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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or because the judicial branch lacked the power to interfere regarding the
President’s performance of a “discretionary duty.” 64
Finally, the en banc Fourth Circuit’s decision in District of Columbia
v. Trump found a lack of appellate jurisdiction regarding Trump’s
argument that he was entitled to absolute immunity from the claims
brought against him in his individual capacity. 65 Judge Motz’s majority
opinion recognized that “[a] district court’s actual refusal to rule on
immunity is treated as a denial of immunity and is immediately
appealable,” 66 and that “[a]n implicit refusal to rule on an immunity
question can also provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction.” 67 But this
route to an immediate appeal is not available when “it is clear that the
district court does intend to rule on a motion asserting an immunity
defense and has not unreasonably delayed in doing so.” 68 Judge Motz
concluded that the district court’s seven-month delay in ruling on Trump’s
motion invoking absolute immunity did not “evince[] an unreasonable
delay or a desire to needlessly prolong this litigation,” noting the district
court’s “express statements that it would rule on the President’s motion to
dismiss and its diligence in attending to other important matters in the
case.” 69
It appears that the next stop for the Maryland emoluments litigation
is the U.S. Supreme Court. In June 2020, Trump asked the Fourth Circuit
to extend its previously entered stay on further district court proceedings,
indicating that he plans to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court. 70 The timing could be quite interesting, because the November
2020 election may affect whether a live controversy will still exist
regarding Trump’s conduct and the Emoluments Clauses. 71

64. Id. at 288.
65. 959 F.3d at 129.
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 131 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 132.
70. See Motion to Extend the Stay of District Court Proceedings Pending the Resolution of a
Forthcoming Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and any Further Proceedings in the Supreme Court, In
re Trump (June 12, 2020) (No. 18-2486), 2020 WL 3183539; see also Motion to Stay the Mandate,
District of Columbia v. Trump (June 12, 2020) (No. 18-2488), 2020 WL 3183540 (asking the Fourth
Circuit to “stay the mandate to preserve the status quo pending a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court”).
71. Whether the result of the 2020 election could make the emoluments litigation moot as a
formal matter is a question beyond the scope of this Article. Even if a live controversy remains, the
election could affect the Supreme Court’s interest in granting certiorari.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/6

12

Steinman: Appellate Jurisdiction & Emoluments

2019]

B.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION & EMOLUMENTS

671

The D.C. Circuit

With respect to the D.C. district court’s ruling in Blumenthal, Trump
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the D.C. Circuit. The three-judge
panel (Judges Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins) denied the writ without
prejudice in a per curiam opinion. 72 As for the substantive issues
addressed in the district court’s rulings, the D.C. Circuit stated simply:
“Although Petitioner has identified substantial questions concerning
standing and the cause of action, he has not shown a clear and indisputable
right to dismissal of the complaint in this case on either of those
grounds.” 73
The D.C. Circuit then turned to Trump’s request for an order
directing the district court to certify the orders for interlocutory appeal
under § 1292(b). The panel observed that “it appears to this court that the
district court abused its discretion by concluding that an immediate appeal
would not advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 74 It also
stated that the plaintiffs’ claims against Trump presented “important and
open threshold questions of pure law,” and that such questions “are best
resolved conclusively through an expedited interlocutory appeal with
focused briefing and oral argument, rather than tentatively through the
demanding lens of the mandamus requirement of clear and indisputable
error.” 75
That said, the D.C. Circuit also recognized a divide within the federal
circuits regarding “whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus to order a district court to certify an issue for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” 76 It declined,
however, “to wade into that dispute at this time.” 77 Instead, the panel
“exercised [its] discretion to deny the writ, without prejudice, and remand
the matter to the district court for immediate reconsideration of the motion
to certify.” 78 It then stated that it would retain jurisdiction over “the
decision whether to grant any petition for permission to appeal, should the
district court grant certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) upon
remand.” 79 More pointedly, the panel declared that it would also retain

72. In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 370–73 (4th Cir. 2019), and In re Ford Motor Co.,
344 F.3d 648, 653–55 (7th Cir. 2003)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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jurisdiction over “any subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, should
the district court deny certification upon remand.” 80
Sure enough, the D.C. Circuit’s suggestion to the district court was
successful, and on remand the district court certified the orders under
§ 1292(b). 81 Indeed, the district court viewed the D.C. Circuit’s order as
quite forceful. Consider the district court’s response to a plan proposed by
the plaintiffs that would have proceeded to expedited summary judgment
motions without subjecting Trump to any direct discovery. 82 The district
court did not make an independent assessment of whether § 1292(b)
certification was warranted in light of this proposal. Rather, it felt
compelled to certify its earlier orders because the plaintiffs’ plan was
“inconsistent with the remand order from the D.C. Circuit,”83
emphasizing the D.C. Circuit’s “view” that the district court’s orders
“squarely meet the criteria for certification under Section 1292(b).” 84
Once the district court issued its § 1292(b) certification on remand,
Trump petitioned the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal under
Appellate Rule 5. 85 The D.C. Circuit granted the petition and a three-judge
panel heard oral argument on December 9, 2019. 86 On February 7, 2020,
the panel issued its decision—unanimously concluding that the members
of Congress lacked Article III standing and instructing the district court to
dismiss their complaint.87 The opinion did not address any issues relating
to appellate jurisdiction, except to recognize that the district court
ultimately certified its order under § 1292(b). 88
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANDAMUS AND § 1292(B)
The decisions by the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit panels reveal
two distinct approaches. The initial Fourth Circuit panel embraced the
80. Id.
81. Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21,
2019).
82. See id. at *2.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
85. See FED. R. APP. P. 5(a) (governing petitions for permission to appeal).
86. The panel that heard oral argument was different than the one that ruled on the mandamus
petition. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The oral argument panel was Judges Henderson,
Tatel, and Griffith.
87. Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Because we conclude that the
Members lack standing, we reverse the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss their
complaint.”).
88. Id. at 18 (“On reconsideration, the district court certified both dismissal denials for
interlocutory appeal and stayed its proceedings. We then granted the interlocutory appeal. . . . We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” (citations omitted)).
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view that the court of appeals can use a writ of mandamus not only to
compel a district court to certify an interlocutory order under § 1292(b),
but to “take the district court’s orders as certified” and thereby to address
the merits of those orders without a remand to the district court.89
Although the en banc Fourth Circuit has overturned that decision, Trump
is likely to push this approach as the litigation moves to the Supreme
Court. 90 The D.C. Circuit panel claimed that it was refraining from
deciding whether a court of appeals can compel § 1292(b) certification
through a writ of mandamus, 91 but it nonetheless expressed its view that
the district court had “abused its discretion” in failing to find that the
requirements of § 1292(b) had been met; 92 the D.C. Circuit panel then
remanded the case to the district court “for immediate reconsideration of
the motion to certify.” 93
Although the D.C. Circuit’s approach may seem more modest, both
approaches are problematic. This Part addresses each approach in turn.94
A.

A Court of Appeals Cannot Use Mandamus to Compel § 1292(b)
Certification By the District Court

The approach of the initial Fourth Circuit panel—which permits an
appellate court to compel the district court to certify an order under
§ 1292(b)—would contravene the will of Congress and upend the
structure of the § 1292(b) certification procedure. Section 1292(b) opens
the door to immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order only
“[w]hen a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”95
89. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir. 2019).
90. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting Trump’s intention to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court).
91. In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not wade into that dispute at
this time.”).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. In criticizing the panels’ approaches to the relationship between writs of mandamus and
§ 1292(b), I do not dispute the possibility that orders like those issued by the district courts might be
directly reviewed via a writ of mandamus. As current Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Diane Wood
explained: “[T]he way to secure appellate consideration in such a situation is not by seeking a writ of
mandamus to require the district court to certify something under § 1292(b). It is simply to file a
petition for a writ of mandamus directed to the underlying problem.” In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d
648, 654 (7th Cir. 2003). See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text (discussing the Ford
decision).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
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Chief Judge Henry Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, made
the point well five decades ago in Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp. v. Maxwell. 96 As he put it: “Congress plainly intended that an appeal
under § 1292(b) should lie only when the district court and the court of
appeals agreed on its propriety. It would wholly frustrate this scheme if
the court of appeals could coerce decision by the district judge.” 97
A more recent opinion from the Seventh Circuit, authored by current
Chief Judge Diane Wood, reached the same conclusion. Her opinion in In
re Ford Motor Co. noted that “[m]ost courts have held that mandamus is
not appropriate to compel a district court to certify under § 1292(b),” 98
and explained that “[t]his wealth of authority exists for a very good
reason.” 99 That is, “[t]he whole point of § 1292(b) is to create a dual
gatekeeper system for interlocutory appeals: both the district court and the
court of appeals must agree that the case is a proper candidate for
immediate review before the normal rule requiring a final judgment will
be overridden.” 100 Allowing an appellate court to manufacture district
court certification via mandamus would flout this system—“[i]f someone
disappointed in the district court’s refusal to certify a case under § 1292(b)
has only to go to the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus requiring
such a certification, there will be only one gatekeeper, and the statutory
system will not operate as designed.” 101
Leading treatises agree. The Wright & Miller Federal Practice &
Procedure treatise explains that “[t]he district judge is given authority by
the statute to defeat any opportunity for appeal by certification, in
deference to familiarity with the case and the needs of case
management.” 102 Accordingly, “[a]lthough a court of appeals may be
tempted to assert mandamus power to compel certification, the temptation
should be resisted.” 103 Moore’s Federal Practice recognizes that an
appellate court might use mandamus to review a particular interlocutory
96. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
97. Id. at 1344 (emphasis added).
98. In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing In re Phillips Petroleum
Co., 943 F.2d 63, 67 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1991); Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d
686, 698 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Cessna Aircraft Distributorship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213, 216–17
(8th Cir. 1975); In re Maritime Serv. Corp., 515 F.2d 91, 92 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Plum Tree,
Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 755 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 (2d Cir. 1972)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3929 (3d ed.
1998).
103. Id.
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order, but it should not use mandamus to “compel” the certification of
such an order for immediate appeal under § 1292(b) when the district
court has refused to do so. 104
The impropriety of using mandamus to compel § 1292(b)
certification is confirmed by the statute’s legislative history, which makes
abundantly clear that Congress anticipated a “two keys” 105 system that
required certification by the district judge. 106 According to the House
Report, § 1292(b) appeals are available only when they have “been
approved by trial judges and by courts of appeals.” 107 It emphasized the
bill’s “built-in safeguards” to “prevent numerous and groundless
appeals.” 108 “To begin with, before an appeal can be had, the district court
must certify in writing that the order involves a controlling question of law
and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate
determination of the case.” 109 Only if the court of appeals is “of the same
opinion” as the district court may an appeal proceed. 110
The Senate Report is equally clear. Section 1292(b) made it “possible
for a district judge in a civil action to make an order . . . subject to appeal
by stating in writing in his order that the order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”111 Only after “the
issuance of such a written statement” may a litigant apply to the court of
appeals. 112 The Senate Report emphasized that § 1292(b) appeals are
“discretionary in the first instance with the district judge for he must state
in writing” that the requirements are met.113 Supporting letters—which
104. 19 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 203.33 (3d ed. 2019) (“If certification under
§ 1292(b) is sought and denied, mandamus may lie, not to compel issuance of the necessary statement,
but to review the order for which the certificate was sought.”).
105. Cf. SEINFELD: THE STRONGBOX (NBC television broadcast Feb. 5, 1998) (“George, both
parties don’t have to consent to a breakup. It’s not like you’re launching missiles from a submarine
and you both have to turn your keys.”).
106. See Trump, 958 F.3d at 282 (en banc) (“The legislative history of § 1292(b) confirms
Congress’s clear intent to require both the district court and the court of appeals to agree to allow an
interlocutory appeal and to provide both courts with discretion in deciding whether to do so.”).
107. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1667, at 1 (1958) (emphasis added) (“The bill permits the granting of
appeals from interlocutory or nonfinal court orders where the entertaining of such appeals has been
approved by trial judges and by courts of appeals.”).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“In addition, the court of appeals must also be of the same opinion before the appeal
can be had.” (emphasis added)).
111. S. REP. NO. 85-2434, at 2 (1958) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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were attached to both the House and Senate reports—emphasized “the
requirement of the certificate of the trial judge,” 114 and explained that “the
certificate of the trial judge is essential.” 115
Finally, oral testimony before the House Judiciary Committee
repeatedly stressed the absolute necessity of the district court judge
certifying the issue for an immediate appeal. 116 Chief Judge John Parker
of the Fourth Circuit noted that the Judicial Conference of the United
States had voted against a recommendation to “give the court of appeals
the right to entertain the appeal in its discretion,” embracing instead a
“satisfactory compromise measure,” under which the district judge must
“certif[y] that in his opinion the appeal should be allowed.” 117 As Judge
Parker put it: “You must get from the district judge—he knows all about
what you are up to, and you must get from him a statement that he thinks
that it will probably expedite the termination of the litigation and that the
question is one as to which there is doubt.” 118
Judge Niemeyer’s panel opinion for the Fourth Circuit—which was
ultimately overturned by the en banc court 119—overlooked some crucial
problems with permitting an appellate court to compel a district court to
certify an order under § 1292(b). Although Judge Niemeyer did unearth
two decisions in which the appellate court had used mandamus to direct
the district court to issue a § 1292(b) certification, 120 neither decision
considered the extent to which it would undermine the structure and

114. Id. at 6 (Letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States) (“The right of appeal
given by the amendatory statute is limited . . . by the requirement of the certificate of the trial judge,
who is familiar with the litigation and will not be disposed to countenance dilatory tactics.”).
115. Id. at 9 (Letter to the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference) (“We believe that the certificate
of the trial judge is essential both to recognition of the appropriate case and to rejection of applications
calculated merely to delay the day of judgment.”).
116. See Appeals from Interlocutory Orders and Confinement in Jail-Type Institutions:
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. (1958).
117. Id. at 9.
118. Id. at 11; see also id. at 22 (“You have got to have the certificate of the district court
judge.”); id. at 19 (testimony of Representative Edwin Willis) (“The lower court judge must express
an opinion that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds
for difference of opinion, and then he must go further and state that in his opinion an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. That is putting the
judge pretty well on the spot. He has got to come out and express his opinion on those two.” (emphasis
added)); id. at 20 (testimony of Third Circuit Judge Albert Maris) (“As you point out, this says that
the district judge has got to render his opinion and sign a statement that although he has decided it
one way there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” (emphasis added)).
119. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text.
120. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671
F.2d 426, 431–32 (11th Cir. 1982), and In re McClelland Eng’rs, Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 837, 839 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
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purpose of § 1292(b). 121 In terms of quality, those decisions stand in stark
contrast to the careful reasoning of Judges Friendly and Wood; 122 and in
terms of quantity, they are significantly outweighed by the “wealth of
authority” against this use of mandamus. 123
Judge Niemeyer’s textual analysis is also misguided. He placed great
weight on the use of the word “shall” in § 1292(b), describing the statute
as providing:
that a district court “shall” certify its order for interlocutory appeal when
the court determines that its order “involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.” 124

Yet this analysis omitted § 1292(b)’s phrase “be of the opinion.” 125
The requirement that the district court “shall so state in writing” applies
only when “the district judge shall be of the opinion” that the elements of
§ 1292(b) are satisfied. 126 The importance of that language is bolstered by
§ 1292(b)’s legislative history and its dual certification system. 127
These problems go directly to whether an appellate court may use a
writ of mandamus to require a district court to certify an issue for
immediate appeal under § 1292(b). Although there is some inconsistency
regarding the conditions that must be satisfied to justify appellate
mandamus, 128 Judge Niemeyer himself invoked three requirements that
the Supreme Court identified in its 2004 Cheney decision: “A party
seeking a writ of mandamus must demonstrate (1) that it has a ‘clear and
indisputable’ right; (2) that there are ‘no other adequate means’ to
vindicate that right; and (3) that the writ is ‘appropriate under the

121. See Fernandez-Roque, 671 F.2d at 431–32 (granting mandamus to require the district court
to “resolve the question of its jurisdiction” and to “specify the exact nature of the claim or claims as
to which jurisdiction is now alleged to reside in the district court,” and then ordering that “[t]he
question of subject matter jurisdiction shall then be certified to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), upon request by any party”); McClelland, 742 F.2d at 839 (failing to cite or quote
§ 1292(b), but “request[ing] that the district court certify its interlocutory order for appeal”).
122. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1326 (2d Cir. 1972);
supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
123. In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
124. Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 369 (4th Cir. 2019) (selectively quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See supra notes 105–118 and accompanying text.
128. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1263–
65 (2007).
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circumstances.’” 129 Section 1292(b)’s structure and purpose make this use
of mandamus inappropriate under the circumstances. A categorical rule
against appellate courts compelling district courts to certify an order under
§ 1292(b) is the best understanding of both § 1292(b) and the mandamus
authority of appellate courts.
To be clear, this argument goes beyond the usual rhetoric of
reluctance regarding writs of mandamus. Although it is often said that
mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy” that is not to be “used
as a substitute for the regular appeals process,” 130 in practice mandamus
has been deployed to reverse a broad range of district court decisions
without waiting for the final judgment required by § 1291. 131 Whether
such examples reflect the most faithful understanding of appellate
mandamus or improper appellate court opportunism, the requirements of
appellate mandamus are open-ended enough to give courts a fair amount
of leeway. What is unique about § 1292(b) is that the certification
structure itself confirms that a district court’s refusal to certify an issue for
an immediate interlocutory appeal should never satisfy the requirements
of appellate mandamus. 132
Independent of whether an appellate court can use mandamus to
override a district court’s refusal to certify under § 1292(b), it is worth
interrogating Judge Niemeyer’s assumption that the requirements of
§ 1292(b) were, in fact, met in the emoluments litigation. His analysis
focused exclusively on whether there was a “substantial ground for
difference of opinion” regarding the district court’s denial of Trump’s
dispositive motions. 133 Even if that requirement is met, however,
§ 1292(b) certification is allowed only if “an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” 134 Given the course of the emoluments litigation, it is far from
clear that immediate appellate review of the various district court rulings
actually does so. The Maryland district court had ruled on Trump’s

129. Trump, 928 F.3d at 368 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81
(2004)).
130. E.g., Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81.
131. See Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality–Appealability Problem, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 174 (1984) (noting that mandamus “has become an ordinary rather than an
extraordinary route of appeal”); Steinman, supra note 128, at 1273–76.
132. See also Trump, 958 F.3d at 283 (en banc) (“It is always difficult to establish a ‘clear and
indisputable’ right to a decision that lies within a court’s discretion, but it is particularly problematic
when doing so circumvents the specific process Congress has prescribed for seeking interlocutory
review.”).
133. Trump, 928 F.3d at 369–71.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
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motions to dismiss by July 2018. 135 But for the stürm und drang
surrounding Trump’s desperate attempt to obtain immediate appellate
review, the district court could have supervised a brief discovery phase,
followed by summary judgment motions or a bench trial. 136 That final
judgment could have been promptly appealed, on the merits, informed by
actual facts and evidence,137 without a dispute over appellate jurisdiction
that remains unresolved two years later.
Judge Motz’s majority opinion for the en banc Fourth Circuit
suggested a narrower role for writs of mandamus in the § 1292(b) context.
She wrote that issuing a writ of mandamus might be justified if “the
district court ignored a request for certification, denied such a request
based on nothing more than caprice, or made its decision in manifest bad
faith.” 138 Even if one accepts this possibility, it is far from clear that the
proper mandamus remedy is to compel certification by the district court—
much less to “take the district court’s orders as certified” 139 (as Judge
Niemeyer would have done). 140 In any event, the inquiry suggested by
Judge Motz would not open the door to an appellate court overriding a
district judge’s own assessment of whether the requirements of § 1292(b)
were met.
B.

The Court of Appeals Cannot Use the Threat of Mandamus to
“Nudge” the District Court to Certify under § 1292(b)

On one hand, the D.C. Circuit’s handling of the § 1292(b) issue in
the emoluments litigation may seem more modest than the Fourth
Circuit’s. It did not use mandamus to compel the district court to certify
the order under § 1292(b). And it certainly did not cut the district court
entirely out of the process by “tak[ing] the district court’s orders as
certified.” 141 Rather, the D.C. Circuit panel made the following moves:

135. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 875 (D. Md. 2018); District of
Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 725 (D. Md. 2018).
136. Such expedited district court proceedings were proposed in the Blumenthal case. See
Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2019).
137. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288 (2013)
(“[T]he distinguished proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the
courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”).
138. Trump, 958 F.3d at 285.
139. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
140. For example, the court of appeals might direct the district court to address the § 1292(b)
criteria via a true “judicial act”—rather than in a way that was “arbitrary or based on passion or
prejudice.” Trump, 958 F.3d at 285 (quoting Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 15 (1856)).
141. Trump, 928 F.3d at 372.
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(1) the panel observed that it “appears to this court that the district court
abused its discretion” by failing to certify the order under § 1292(b); (2)
the panel denied the mandamus petition “without prejudice”; (3) the panel
remanded the case to the district court “for immediate reconsideration of
the motion to certify”; and (4) the panel made clear that it will “retain
jurisdiction” over “any subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, should
the district court deny certification upon remand.” 142
This technique—one might think of it as a mandamus nudge 143 (if
not a more aggressive term)—has been deployed by a number of federal
courts of appeals, particularly in controversial cases. This Section first
summarizes other recent high-profile cases where appellate courts have
used this tactic. It then argues that this approach, although seemingly less
intrusive than the Fourth Circuit’s direct use of mandamus, is also
unjustifiable.
1. A Growing Trend
The D.C. Circuit’s initial handling of Blumenthal v. Trump was not
an isolated incident in the federal appellate world. Another example is a
recent lawsuit filed by several individuals and an association of young
environmental activists against the federal government and certain federal
officials and agencies. 144 The plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States alleged
that the federal government’s actions relating to fossil fuels and their
effect on the climate violated their constitutional rights under the Due
Process Clause. 145 The district court denied the defendants’ various
dispositive motions, which sought to end the case on grounds ranging

142.
143.

In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV.
F. 210 (2014).
144. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016) (“Plaintiffs in this civil
rights action are a group of young people between the ages of eight and nineteen . . . ; Earth Guardians,
an association of young environmental activists; and Dr. James Hansen, acting as guardian for future
generations. Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants the United States, President Barack Obama,
and numerous executive agencies.”), rev’d and remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
145. Id. (“Plaintiffs allege defendants have known for more than fifty years that the carbon
dioxide (‘CO2’) produced by burning fossil fuels was destabilizing the climate system in a way that
would significantly endanger plaintiffs, with the damage persisting for millennia. . . . Although many
different entities contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, plaintiffs aver defendants bear a higher
degree of responsibility than any other individual, entity, or country for exposing plaintiffs to the
dangers of climate change. Plaintiffs argue defendants’ actions violate their substantive due process
rights to life, liberty, and property, and that defendants have violated their obligation to hold certain
natural resources in trust for the people and for future generations.” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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from standing to political question doctrine to others. 146 The district judge
then rejected the defendants’ request to certify the issues for interlocutory
appeal under § 1292(b). 147
The defendants filed multiple petitions for a writ of mandamus in the
Ninth Circuit, but they were initially unsuccessful. 148 The defendants then
sought a stay from the Supreme Court pending the disposition of their
Supreme Court petition for a writ of mandamus. 149 The Supreme Court
denied the stay without prejudice, noting that “adequate relief may be
available in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.”150
Even though the Ninth Circuit had denied the defendants’ prior mandamus
requests, the Supreme Court observed that the Ninth Circuit “did so
without prejudice,” and that some of the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for denial
“are, to a large extent, no longer pertinent.” 151 The Supreme Court also
observed that “the striking breadth” of the plaintiffs’ claims “presents
substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” 152
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit executed
the § 1292(b) mandamus nudge. In an unpublished order, the Ninth

146. Id. at 1235–61 (rejecting defendants’ and intervenors’ arguments in support of their
motions to dismiss); Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1076–1104 (D. Or. 2018)
(denying in part and granting in part defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion
for summary judgment).
147. Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 (D. Or. 2018) (“[T]he requests to certify for interlocutory
appeal made both in the motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment are
denied.”); Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705, at *2 (D. Or. June 8,
2017) (“[C]ertification for interlocutory appeal is not warranted in this case.”).
148. See In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e decline to exercise our
discretion to grant mandamus relief at this stage of the litigation.”); In re United States, 895 F.3d
1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In this petition for a writ of mandamus, the government asks us for the
second time to direct the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies, or,
in the alternative, to stay all discovery and trial. We denied the government’s first mandamus petition,
concluding that it had not met the high bar for relief at that stage of the litigation. No new
circumstances justify this second petition, and we again decline to grant mandamus relief.” (citations
omitted)).
149. See In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 452 (2018).
150. Id. at 453.
151. Id.
152. Id. This portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion cited its earlier ruling on the Juliana
defendants’ request to stay district court proceedings pending disposition by the Ninth Circuit of one
of its petitions for a writ of mandamus. Id. (citing “this Court’s order of July 30, 2018, No. 18A65”).
The Supreme Court denied that earlier application “without prejudice,” noting at that time that the
defendant’s “request for relief is premature.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S.
Ct. 1, 1 (2018). The Court wrote, however, that “[t]he breadth of [the plaintiffs’] claims is striking”
and that “the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion,” and
it urged the district court to “take these concerns into account in assessing the burdens of discovery
and trial, as well as the desirability of a prompt ruling on the Government’s pending dispositive
motions.” Id.
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Circuit panel declined to rule at that time on the defendants’ mandamus
petition, 153 but it ordered that the district court is “requested to promptly
resolve petitioners’ motion to reconsider the denial of the request to
certify orders for interlocutory review.” 154 It provided no further
explanation, although it cited the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling as
“noting that the justiciability of plaintiffs’ claims ‘presents substantial
grounds for difference of opinion.’” 155
Sure enough, the district court reconsidered. Calling the Ninth
Circuit’s nudge an “extraordinary order,” the district court wrote that “[a]t
this time, the Court finds sufficient cause to revisit the question of
interlocutory appeal as to its previous orders, and upon reconsideration,
the Court finds that each of the factors outlined in § 1292(b) have been
met.” 156 The Ninth Circuit then promptly—although not without
controversy 157—granted the defendants’ permission to appeal.158 There
was therefore no need to rule on the mandamus petition, which it denied
as moot. 159 Having overcome the obstacles to appellate jurisdiction, a
Ninth Circuit panel ultimately reversed the district court in a 2-1 decision
and ordered that the Juliana case be dismissed for lack of Article III
standing. 160
Another high-profile example is ongoing litigation challenging
various abortion regulations in Louisiana. In June Medical Services, LLC
v. Gee, the district court denied several dispositive motions seeking to
dismiss the cases. 161 Although the district court initially certified its order
153. Order at 2, In re United States, (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018) (No. 18-73014) (ordering additional
briefing regarding the mandamus petition).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov.
21, 2018); see also Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing the
district court as having “reluctantly certified the orders denying the motions for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)” (emphasis added)).
157. As discussed infra notes 176–184 and accompanying text, Judge Friedland dissented from
the Ninth Circuit’s grant of permission to appeal following the district court’s reluctant § 1292(b)
certification.
158. Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176, 2018 WL 10426470, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018)
(“The district court properly concluded that the issues presented by this case satisfied the standard set
forth in § 1292(b) and properly exercised its discretion in certifying this case for interlocutory appeal.
The petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is granted.”).
159. Order, In re United States, (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (No. 18-73014) (“The petition for a
writ of mandamus is DENIED as moot.”).
160. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). Although the panel found
that the plaintiffs satisfied the injury and causation requirements of Article III standing, the majority
concluded that they had not shown that their “claimed injuries are redressable by an Article III court.”
Id. at 1168–69.
161. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 306 F. Supp. 3d 886, 889 (M.D. La. 2018).
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under § 1292(b), 162 it later vacated the certification in order to allow the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint. 163 It then denied the defendants’
motion to partially dismiss the amended complaint and denied their
request to certify that order under § 1292(b). 164
The defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Fifth
Circuit. 165 Although the Fifth Circuit panel opined that there were a
number of factors that “support issuance of the writ,” it declined to do
so. 166 This denial, however, came with a § 1292(b) nudge. The panel was
“confident” that a writ of mandamus was “unnecessary,” 167 because “[i]f
the district court chooses to certify its decision for interlocutory appeal,
some or all of the State’s arguments could be resolved without the need
for mandamus.” 168 Citing the D.C. Circuit’s nudge in the emoluments
litigation, the Fifth Circuit wrote:
This panel will retain jurisdiction over the decision whether to grant any
application for permission to appeal, should the district court grant
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), or any subsequent petition
for writ of mandamus, should the district court deny certification or fail
to resolve the State’s jurisdictional challenges. 169

Whether this nudge will work—as it did in Blumenthal and
Juliana—remains to be seen. In October 2019, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari regarding certain other issues in the litigation. 170 This prompted

162. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, No. CV 17-00404-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 2224064, at *1
(M.D. La. May 15, 2018).
163. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, No. CV 17-00404-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 2656552, at *1
(M.D. La. June 4, 2018).
164. Order at 1, June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, (M.D. La. March 29, 2019) (No. CV 17-00404BAJ-RLB).
165. In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 153 (5th Cir. 2019).
166. Id. at 170 (“The district court’s failure to consider the State’s jurisdictional challenges and
the inadequacy of a later appeal support issuance of the writ. We nonetheless exercise our discretion
not to issue it at this time.”); see also id. at 173 (“[W]e think it prudent not to issue the writ at this
time.”).
167. Id. at 156 (“[W]e exercise our discretion not to grant Defendants’ mandamus petition at
this time because we are confident it is unnecessary.”).
168. Id. at 173.
169. Id. (citing In re Trump, No. 19-5196, 781 F. App’x 1, 2019 WL 3285234, at *1–2 (D.C.
Cir. July 19, 2019) (per curiam)).
170. See Gee v. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. 35, 35 (2019); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Gee, 140 S. Ct. 35, 35–36 (2019). Prior to the March 2020 oral argument, Rebekah Gee resigned as
Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and was replaced by Interim Secretary
Stephen Russo. These cases are now captioned Russo v. June Medical Services L.L.C. and June
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo.
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a joint motion to stay proceedings in the district court, 171 which the district
judge granted “pending a final judgment by the United States Supreme
Court.” 172
2. What’s Wrong with the D.C. Circuit’s Handling of § 1292(b)
Although this approach may seem less intrusive, it suffers from the
same fundamental problem as the initial Fourth Circuit panel’s more
aggressive use of mandamus. Without mandamus authority to compel
§ 1292(b) certification, it is hard to justify why an appellate court would
have the authority to pick nits regarding the district court’s § 1292(b)
reasoning.
At the very least, it is concerning for an appellate court to leverage
the uncertainty surrounding its ultimate authority to compel § 1292(b)
certification to nudge the district court to provide that certification
following remand. That is exactly what the initial D.C. Circuit panel did.
It acknowledged the conflict between the Fourth Circuit’s panel decision
in In re Trump and decisions like the Seventh Circuit’s Ford decision but
stated that “[w]e need not wade into that dispute at this time.” 173 The D.C.
Circuit absolutely did need to “wade into that dispute”; without the
authority to review the district court’s § 1292(b) certification decision, it
had no basis to call that decision into question and remand for “immediate
reconsideration of the motion to certify.” 174 For all the reasons laid out in
the preceding Section, 175 appellate courts lack that authority.
Moreover, it is not clear that a district judge who certifies an order
under § 1292(b) only after a threat by the appellate court truly is “of the
opinion” that the requirements of § 1292(b) are satisfied. Judge Friedland
made this point in her dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s grant of permission
to appeal after the district judge in Juliana was nudged into granting
certification.176 As she explained: “Although the district court’s statement
that the § 1292(b) factors were met would ordinarily support certification,
here it appears that the court felt compelled to make that declaration even

171. Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings, at 1, June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, (M.D. La. Nov. 26,
2019) (No. CV 17-00404-BAJ-RLB).
172. Order at 1, June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, (M.D. La. Dec. 9, 2019) (No. CV 17-00404BAJ-RLB).
173. In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 95–118 and accompanying text.
176. Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176, 2018 WL 10426470, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018)
(Friedland, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Juliana, Dec. 2018 Order].
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though—as the rest of its order suggests—the court did not believe that to
be true.” 177
This was “very concerning,” 178 according to Judge Friedland, for
essentially the same reasons that underlie § 1292(b)’s dual-certification
structure. 179 She noted that “§ 1292(b) reserves for the district court the
threshold determination whether its two factors are met.” 180 Respect for
the district court’s true “opinion” regarding § 1292(b)’s requirements is
especially important as to whether “an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” 181
because the district court has “direct experience with the parties,
knowledge of the status of discovery, and the ability to sequence issues
for trial.” 182 The district judge is, therefore, “far better positioned to assess
how to resolve the litigation most efficiently.” 183 Put simply, “[s]ection
1292(b) respects the district court’s superior vantage point and its
particular, critical role in the judicial process by allowing an interlocutory
appeal only when the district court is ‘of the opinion’ that both of the
section’s requirements are met.” 184
Indeed, the logistics of nudging the district judge to change her
“opinion” undermines the efficiency rationale behind § 1292(b). The goal
of “materially advanc[ing] the ultimate termination of the litigation” does
not seem to be well-served by cases going up and down multiple times
between the district court and the court of appeals. Perversely, a district
judge who does wish to move the case forward expeditiously to a final
judgment (as could have been done in the emoluments litigation) might
feel compelled to grant the § 1292(b) petition rather than force the parties
into more litigation in the appellate court about the propriety of
mandamus. It is a strange result, particularly when the time spent
jockeying over the availability of an immediate appeal could be better
spent pursuing the relevant facts and evidence and obtaining a final
judgment on the merits. 185 And of course the inefficiencies could
compound. Not every district judge will be as receptive to a nudge from
the court of appeals. Given the discretion vested in district judges by
177.
178.
179.
180.
added).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at *2.
Id.
See supra notes 95–118 and accompanying text.
Juliana, Dec. 2018 Order, 2018 WL 10426470, at *2 (Friedland, J., dissenting) (emphasis
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
Juliana, Dec. 2018 Order, 2018 WL 10426470, at *2 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at *3.
See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
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§ 1292(b)’s dual-certification scheme, 186 she should have every right to
stand her ground. Would that then prompt a return trip to the court of
appeals via another writ of mandamus? And if that return trip leads to the
correct conclusion that mandamus is not ultimately available to compel
certification, 187 the litigation is further stalled for no apparent benefit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous important questions of appellate jurisdiction have arisen
in the emoluments litigation against Donald Trump. In both the D.C.
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, the relationship between appellate
mandamus and the certification process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
has figured prominently. Fortunately, the en banc Fourth Circuit
overturned the initial Fourth Circuit panel’s most aggressive use of
mandamus in this context. But even the D.C. Circuit’s seemingly more
modest mandamus “nudge” is problematic. As future courts—perhaps
even the Supreme Court—confront these questions, it is crucial for them
to consider the text and structure of § 1292(b), as well as the inefficiencies
that appellate intervention via mandamus can cause. These factors weigh
strongly against both the D.C. Circuit’s and the initial Fourth Circuit
panel’s approaches. Going forward, federal appellate courts should avoid
going down those same paths.

186. See supra notes 95–118 and accompanying text.
187. Cf. In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (remanding for the district court to
reconsider § 1292(b) certification without deciding “whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of mandamus to order a district court to certify an issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)” and stating that “[w]e need not wade into that dispute at this time”).
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